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Abstract
Contemporary lawmakers and reformers often argue that ex ante incentive contracts
providing for large material rewards are the best and possibly only way to motivate
corporate executives and other employees to serve their firms' interests. This Article
offers a critique of the "pay for performance" approach. In particular, it explores why,
for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons, workplaces that rely on ex ante incentive
contracts suppress unselfish prosocial behavior (conscience) and promote selfishness
and opportunism. The end result may not be more efficient, but more uncooperative,
unethical, and illegal employee behavior.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the Swiss bank UBS agreed to pay the U.S. government $780,000,000 to
settle charges that it had orchestrated a massive scheme to help wealthy Americans evade
U.S. tax laws.' The UBS case-the largest tax fraud investigation in history 2-began with
the arrest of a single banker named Bradley Birkenfeld. Birkenfeld was one of several
UBS employees who had repeatedly helped clients evade U.S. taxes, and he agreed to
cooperate with the Justice Department in return for being allowed to plead guilty to a
single count of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government. When the judge who heard
Birkenfeld's plea asked him why he had participated in the scheme when he knew he was
breaking the law, the 43-year-old banker replied: "I was incentivized to do this
business."'
The UBS tax scandal is only one of several recent high-profile cases in which
incentive contracts supposedly tempted employees into opportunistic and even illegal
behavior. In April of 2013, the nation was treated to the spectacle of dozens of Atlanta
public school teachers and educators surrendering themselves to authorities after being
indicted for allegedly conspiring to alter student test scores to earn cash bonuses.4
1. William P. Barrett & Janet Novack, UBS Agrees to Pay $780 Million, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2009, 7:00
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/18/ubs-fraud-offshore-personal-financeubs.html.
2. Michael Rubinkam, UBS Tax Evasion Whistle-Blower Reports to Federal Prison, USA TODAY (Jan.
8, 2010, 5:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2010-01-08-ubs-tax-evasion-informant-
prisonN.htm. Birkenfeld had approached the Department of Justice in 2007 with information about UBS's
activities after the IRS adopted a new tax-whistleblower reward program, but he was subsequently indicted
when prosecutors concluded that he had not been fully forthcoming about his own involvement. Id. Birkenfeld
received and served most of a 40-month prison sentence, but he also eventually was awarded $104 million
under the whistleblower reward program. M.V., Whistleblowing: Birkenfeld's Bonanza, THE ECONOMIST (Sept.
11, 2012, 6:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/node/21562860/print.
3. Evan Perez, Guilty Plea By Ex-Banker Likely to Aid Probe of UBS, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2008, 12:01
AM), online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB121389134942588841.
4. David Beasley, Atlanta Educators Surrendering in Cheating Scandal, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2013, 6:28
526 [Vol. 39:3
2014] Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences
Incentive pay has been blamed for the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s' and the
Enron and Worldcom accounting frauds of the late 1990s.' Incentive contracts have also
been identified as a root cause of the 2008 credit crisis, when they tempted mortgage
brokers into approving loans to unqualified buyers' and enticed bank executives into
embracing risky investing and lending practices.'
Despite such object lessons, public enthusiasm for pay for performance is still
growing." As a Wall Street Journal article put it, "Incentive programs are spreading
like ... kudzu."10 When things go wrong, incentive pay advocates typically argue that the
problem lay not in using incentives but in using poorly designed incentives." If we are
sufficiently careful in measuring and rewarding individual performance, the "optimal
contracting" argument goes, pay for performance schemes harness the forces of greed
and self-interest to promote greater efficiency and better economic performance.
This Article challenges conventional wisdom by arguing that pay for performance
strategies, by their very nature, often prove counterproductive and even disastrous
"solutions" to complex social problems like corporate scandals and failing schools.
Optimal contracting theory dominates the ongoing debate over executive compensation
and is seeping into other policy discussions as well because reformers believe that even
when we can't do much else, we can at least "get the incentives right." The assumption
seems to be that ex ante incentives might help, and can't possibly hurt. But pay-for-
performance schemes can hurt.
Optimal contracting theory relies on a homo economicus model of purely self-
interested behavior that predicts that legally enforceable, predetermined material
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/us-usa-schools-atlanta-idUSBRE93 10YP20130402.
5. Executive Compensation: How Much Is Too Much?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 238-39 (2009) (statement of William K. Black, Assoc. Professor of Economics and
Law, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City) [hereinafter Executive Compensation Hearing], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 11hhrg54553/pdflCHRG-1 1hhrg54553.pdf.
6. Margaret M. Blair, Shareholder Value, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Performance: A Post-
Enron Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 53, 61-62 (Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003) (discussing role of stock options
in Worldcom and Enron scandals); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1327-28 (2003) (discussing role of incentives in Enron scandal).
7. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 90 (2011) (discussing
mortgage brokers' incentive compensation).
8. Id. at 17 (discussing how executive compensation based on short-term gains increased riskiness of
financial firms); see generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INCENTIVE COMPENSATION
PRACTICES: A REPORT ON THE HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 1
(2011) ("Risk-taking incentives provided by incentive compensation arrangements in the financial services
industry were a contributing factor to the financial crisis that began in 2007.").
9. RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES 2 (2012)
("Increasingly in the modern world, incentives are becoming the tool we reach for when we wish to bring about
change."); see also Barry Schwartz, Practical Wisdom and Organizations, 31 REs. ORG. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2011),
available at http://www.swarthmore.edu/Documents/academics/psychology/Schwartz9o2OROB.2011-PracWis
Organizations.pdf (discussing modern tendency to rely on incentives to change behavior).
10. Eric Felten, Age ofIncentives: Paying Big Bucks for Puny Results, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704009804575308710787390320.
11. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2485
(Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (describing problems as "consequences of poorly designed pay
programs").
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incentives are the best, and possibly only, tool available to motivate an agent to do what
the principal wants the agent to do. This behavioral model, while elegant and powerful, is
also dangerously misleading. Extensive empirical evidence demonstrates that when
employment contracts are incomplete (as all contracts must be to greater or lesser
degrees), employers can get better results by emphasizing "internal" incentives,
especially the internal force laymen call conscience. What's more, conscience and self-
interest often function as substitutes rather than complements. Ex ante incentive
contracts-even well-designed ones-typically create "psychopathogenic" pressures that
suppress or snuff out conscience. The result may not be more efficient agent behavior but
more opportunistic, unethical, and illegal agent behavior.
By showing how incentive contracts suppress conscience, this Article does not
suggest that pay itself (that is, some form of compensation) is unnecessary. Few
employees are willing to work very long or very hard for free. Nor does this Article claim
that incentive pay is always counterproductive. There may be agency tasks where ex ante
incentive contracts perform quite well, despite their negative effects on conscience.
This Article does advance two counterintuitive claims. The first is that ex ante
incentives are not always the only, or the best, means available for motivating employees.
Extensive behavioral evidence demonstrates that with the right combinations of social
cues and discretionary ex post rewards, many agents will work harder and more honestly
than formal incentive contracts can induce them to. The second point is that for many
complex tasks that principals might want agents to perform in the business world and
elsewhere, employing ex ante incentives can be dangerous because this strategy
suppresses conscience and promotes selfishness for a variety of reasons. The natural
implication of the two points is that instead of relying on ex ante incentives, corporations
and other employers often might do better to rely on ex post, trust-based compensation
arrangements that recognize both the principal's and the agent's capacity to reciprocate
prosocial behavior.
Part II of this Article begins by describing the optimal contracting approach and its
history. It shows how when optimal contracting theorists speak of "incentives," they are
not using the word in a broad sense as a synonym for "motivations," as in, "My love for
my child gives me incentive to take her to the pediatrician." Rather, they are speaking of
predetermined financial or material rewards that are formally negotiated and specified ex
ante. Part II shows how the notion that ex ante incentives provide the best, and possibly
only, way to channel human behavior-an idea that implicitly assumes people are
opportunistic and selfish-has exercised increasing influence in private employment
markets and regulatory policy. As an important example, Part II describes the 1993
amendment of the tax code to encourage publicly held companies to use high-powered ex
ante incentive schemes to compensate executives. Part II then explores how, despite the
enthusiastic embrace of incentive pay by academics, policymakers, and reformers, there
is remarkably little empirical evidence to support the claim that incentive contracts
actually produce better results, in the business world or elsewhere. Yet rather than
question the efficacy of incentive compensation schemes, many experts continue to insist
the solution is simply to use more and better ones.
Part III explores some reasons why incentive pay often backfires. In particular, Part
III surveys what behavioral science in general, and experimental gaming in particular, has
revealed about the empirical phenomenon of unselfish prosocial behavior (conscience).
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Contrary to the assumption of opportunistic selfishness that underlies optimal contracting
theory, real people often act in an unselfish, prosocial fashion. In lay terms, they act as if
they have a conscience that spurs them, at least sometimes, to sacrifice their own material
payoffs to help or avoid harming others and to follow ethical rules. While different
individuals show different proclivities toward conscientiousness, the data demonstrates
that conscience is neither rare nor quirky. Almost anyone other than a clinical psychopath
is likely to act unselfishly when certain social cues support unselfishness and the personal
cost of acting unselfishly is not too high. Part III uses these findings to propose a simple
model of conscience that offers four useful lessons for optimal contracting theory. First,
conscience (unselfish prosocial behavior) exists and is a common behavioral
phenomenon. Second, conscientious behavior seems triggered primarily by important
social cues, especially instructions from authority, perceptions of common group
membership, beliefs about others' prosocial behavior, and perceptions of benefits to
others. Third, even when the social cues support conscience, it can disappear if the
personal cost of acting conscientiously becomes too great. Fourth, individuals vary in
their willingness and inclinations toward unselfish prosocial behavior.
Part IV explores what the findings described in Part III imply about the effects of
high-powered incentive schemes. In particular, through at least three different but
mutually reinforcing mechanisms, incentive contracts tend to suppress conscience and
encourage opportunistic and even illegal behavior that conscience otherwise would keep
in check. First, incentive schemes frame social context in a fashion that encourages
people to conclude purely selfish behavior is both appropriate and expected. As a result,
pay-for-performance rules "crowd out" concern for others' welfare and for ethical rules,
making the assumption of selfish opportunism a self-fulfilling prophecy. Second, the
possibility of reaping large personal rewards from incentive schemes tempts people to cut
ethical and legal comers, and once an individual succumbs to temptation, future lapses
become more likely. The result can be a downward spiral into opportunistic and unlawful
behavior. Third, industries and firms that emphasize incentive pay tend to attract
individuals who, even if they are not clinical psychopaths, nevertheless are more inclined
toward selfish and opportunistic behavior than the average. Once such relatively selfish
actors come to dominate a workplace, less-selfish employees leave, and the employees
who remain start acting in a more purely self-interested and opportunistic fashion.
Part V concludes by considering some implications for contemporary law and
policy. The pay-for-performance approach dominates compensation practices in the
executive suite today. It is also gaining popularity in our nation's schools, newsrooms,
and medical centers. The scientific evidence suggests this may be a dangerous
development. It may be counterproductive to compensate people primarily through large
ex ante financial incentives. Sometimes, perhaps often, employers get better results by
adopting exactly the opposite approach: emphasizing rewards that are modest,
nonmonetary, and awarded ex post. This reality has important implications not only for
the current debate over regulating executive compensation, but for other pressing issues
of law and public policy as well.
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II. OPTIMAL CONTRACTING AND THE IDEOLOGY OF INCENTIVES
Economists and legal scholars have been studying the problem of how to best
compensate corporate executives for decades." From the beginning, the academic
literature on executive compensation has typically analyzed the problem from an
"optimal contracting" perspective." Optimal contracting theory views the task of setting
an executive's compensation (or any employee's or agent's compensation) as a version of
what economists call the agency cost problem. 4
Economic theory predicts that "agency costs" arise whenever a rational and selfish
principal hires a rational and selfish agent to accomplish something the principal wants
done. Because the agent is selfish, if left to his own devices, he may not do what the
principal wants done. To use the words of Michael Jensen and William Meckling (two of
the earliest and most influential writers in the executive compensation debate): "If both
parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal."" By the same token, if the
principal is purely selfish, she will do whatever she can to minimize any payment she
makes to the agent. The solution for both parties is to draft an "efficient" or "optimal"
contract that legally obligates the principal to pay the agent specific compensation that is
tied ex ante to specific observable measures of the agent's performance.
In the executive compensation debate, the agency cost problem is typically framed
as a problem of getting self-interested corporate directors and executives to serve the
interests of the firm's shareholders. As Margaret Blair has put it, "[T]he conventional
wisdom has been that directors and managers of companies will always make decisions
in ways that serve their own personal interests unless .. . given very strong incentives ...
."16 Thus, the problem of executive compensation is framed as a problem of designing
incentives that motivate executives to serve shareholders' interests."
12. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But
How, HARV. Bus. REV., May 1990, at 138; Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, The Firm As An Incentive
System, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 972 (1994); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULLFILLED PROMISE OF ExEcUTIvE COMPENSATION (2004); see generally Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay
Without Performance: The Tournament Alternative, 54 EMoRY L.J. 1557 (2005).
13. Anabtawi, supra note 12, at 1561 ("The optimal contracting model underlies most scholarship in the
area of executive compensation.").
14. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (describing the agency cost problem in
firms).
15. Id. at 308.
16. Blair, supra note 6, at 60.
17. Elsewhere, Margaret Blair and I have pointed out at length that directors and executives owe duties
not only to shareholders but also to the firm as a legal entity, suggesting there is reason to question whether
directors are agents of shareholders or of the firm itself. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 246, 292-309 (1999) (discussing the nature of directors'
duties). See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: How PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) (arguing at length why directors should not be
considered agents primarily of shareholders but rather of the firm itself).
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A. The Meaning of "Incentives"
It is important to understand exactly what executive compensation experts mean
when they talk about incentives. Laypersons often use the word broadly as a synonym for
motivation, as in, "My guilt gives me incentive to call my mother." But optimal
contracting theorists typically do not concern themselves with internal, subjective
motivations like guilt, love, or pride. In optimal contracting scholarship, the word
"incentive" refers specifically to external punishments or rewards that share three
important characteristics: (1) They are monetary or material in nature; (2) They are of a
significant size; and (3) They are contractually predetermined, set in advance according
to some ex ante algorithm or formula. Let us consider each characteristic in turn, as each
is an important element of the optimal contracting approach that contributes to its
limitations.
Addressing first the element of monetary value, the word "incentive" must be
confined to monetary or material rewards, or optimal contracting theory-indeed
economic analysis generally-loses its intellectual content. Using the word "incentive" to
refer to anything that motivates behavior reduces economic theory to a tautology. (If
economics is based on the principle that "people respond to incentives," and incentives
then are defined as "anything people respond to," the logic becomes circular.)"
Moreover, only monetary, or at least material, incentives lend themselves to formal
incentive contracting. It is relatively easy to enforce a contract that says "you will get a
million stock options at an exercise price of $30 per share." It is much harder, and
perhaps impossible, to enforce a contract that provides "you will be loved, honored, and
esteemed." Pay for performance advocates are really advocating "pay money, or some
other good with an ascertainable market value, for performance."
Second, as the phrase "high-powered incentives" implies, optimal contracting theory
does not object to, and even embraces, very large incentive payments. After all, the larger
the payment, the more it "incentivizes" the agent to perform." Conversely, nominal or
token rewards have little or no importance in the theory.
Third and perhaps most important, optimal contracting theory assumes that the rules
for determining what exactly the agent must do to earn his or her pay, and for deciding
the form and magnitude of the agent's pay, must be objective and must be agreed upon
and specified in advance. Ex ante agreement to an objective performance goal is essential
because optimal contract theory, like other theories that rely on the homo economicus
model, leaves no room for trust. No rational and purely selfish agent would be so foolish
as to rely on an employment contract that provides, "if you do a good job as we see it,
we'll reward you with a bonus we think appropriate." Similarly, no rational and selfish
principal would promise an executive "we'll give you a million dollar salary and trust
you to do the best you can." Optimal contracting theory assumes that formal contracts
can control the behavior of agents and principals only when the contract terms are
18. See STEVE E. LANDSBURG, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST: ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3 (1993)
("Most of economics can be summarized in four words: 'People respond to incentives.').
19. See generally Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 12 (discussing high-powered and low-powered
incentives); see, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 8 (advocating for large payments when justified by
results); Jensen & Murphy, supra note 12, at 3-4 (arguing for large pay packages that provide high-powered
incentives).
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objective, enforceable, and clearly specified ex ante.
B. The Rise ofIncentive Ideology
Judged by these standards, the methods that Corporate America used to compensate
executives during the "managerialist" era of the 1920s through 1980s were hopelessly
backward and inefficient. 20 Before optimal contracting theory gained influence, business
executives were typically paid primarily with fixed salaries and the occasional modest
bonus, both adjusted ex post on the basis of subjective criteria." ("You did a great job this
past year; we're giving you a bonus and a raise.") Nonmonetary rewards were coveted
and common. ("You've earned a key to the executive washroom.") Executive pay,
though hardly stingy, was relatively modest and stable. In the early 1980s, the top three
executives of the largest 50 U.S. corporations earned average inflation-adjusted
compensation of approximately $1 million annually-only slightly more than the top
three executives of comparable companies earned in 1940. By 2000, this figure had
quadrupled to $4 million.22
Despite this, American executives did well for investors in the days before pay for
performance. Public companies run by executives who were paid fixed salaries and
modest bonuses provided investors with significant positive returns. For example,
between 1950 (the year the Standard & Poor's 500 Index was first published) and 1990,
the Index produced inflation-adjusted total returns that averaged more than ten percent
each decade.
In the early 1990s, however, the idea of incentive pay captured the hearts and minds
of reformers and business leaders alike. This enthusiasm for the optimal contracting
approach was part of a broader social trend, the rise of law and economics.2 4 As economic
analysis became increasingly influential in legal and policy discussions, so did optimal
contracting theory in executive compensation discussions." The idea of pay for
performance also benefited from the fact it seemed so obvious-people enjoy having
20. See INST. FOR GOVERNANCE, PAY FOR VALUE: CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT OF EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 33 (2012) (describing managerialist era and its compensation practices); Tamara C. Belinfanti,
Beyond Economics in Pay for Performance, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91, 103 (2012) (citation omitted) ("Prior to
1993, corporations mostly compensated executives with fixed salaries and discretionary bonuses.").
21. INST. FOR GOVERNANCE, supra note 20, at 19 fig.4 (showing that salary and bonus payments
accounted for 74-99% of CEO pay in the 50 largest U.S. companies from the 1940s through the 1980s, falling
to 40% of pay by the mid-2000s, while stock options, and long-term incentive plans rose to account for 60% of
CEO pay).
22. Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term
Perspective, 1936-2005, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2099, 2107 fig.1 (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/frydman/
www/trends-rfs20 10.pdf.
23. This figure is calculated by taking the average of the annual returns for the four decades of the 1950s,
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. See S&P 500: Total and Inflation-Adjusted Historical Returns, SIMPLE STOCK
INVESTING, http://www.simplestockinvesting.com/SP500-historical-real-total-returns.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2014).
24. In a 2008 study of conservative trends in legal thought, scholar Steven Teles described the law and
economics movement as "the most successful intellectual movement in the law of the past thirty years."
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATrLE FOR CONTROL OF THE
LAW 216 (2008).
25. Cf Belinfanti, supra note 20, at 110-17 (tracing pay-for-performance ideology to economists).
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money, so why not assume the prospect of having more money would necessarily
motivate them to perform better? The end result is that today, the idea that executives can
only be trusted to work hard and honestly if their pay is somehow tied to an objective
performance metric has been accepted by a generation of corporate experts as a truth so
obvious it does not need further examination.26 As Michael Dorff puts it, "Questioning
pay for performance is rather like questioning gravity.""
The ideology of incentives has directly influenced the law. One of the clearest
examples is in the U.S. tax code. In 1990, economists Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy
published an influential article in the Harvard Business Review calling for companies to
tie their executives' pay to objective metrics." Only a few years later, the U.S. Congress
passed a major revision of the Internal Revenue Code to encourage public companies to
do just that.2 9 Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) provides that public corporations
cannot deduct any annual compensation in excess of $1 million that is paid to their top
five executives unless that compensation is tied to an objective corporate performance
metric." Section 162(m) accordingly requires corporations that seek to minimize their tax
burdens to adopt incentive pay schemes for their most highly paid executives."
Of course, Section 162(m) has proven an utter failure when it comes to reining in the
size of executive pay.32 In the wake of Section 162(m)'s adoption, executive pay at public
companies increased dramatically; even adjusting for inflation, total median annual
compensation for CEOs of large public companies increased from about $2.6 million
annually in 1993 to more than $14 million by 2000.11 However, Section 162(m) has been
quite successful in changing the way public companies compensate their CEOs and other
executives. The years since 1993 have seen a seismic shift in the compensation practices
of American business corporations, to the point where incentive pay now provides the
bulk of compensation for top executives. In 1993, the percentage of CEO compensation
attributable to incentive pay was only 35%.34 Today this figure has risen to 85%."
26. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 42 (2011)
(discussing acceptance of incentive ideology).
27. MICHAEL B. DORFF, INDISPENSABLE AND OTHER MYTHS: WHY THE CEO PAY EXPERIMENT FAILED
AND How To Fix IT (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 126) (on file with author).
28. See generally Jensen & Murphy, supra note 12, at 138; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What are the Problems, and How to Fix Them
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004) [hereinafter Remuneration],
available at http://www2.gsu.edu/-wwwseh/Remuneration%20Where%2OWeve%20Been.pdf (providing
numerous recommendations for "reforming" the system of executive compensation).
29. See Belinfanti, supra note 20, at 104 (discussing adoption of I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012) and stating that
employees of public corporations cannot deduct remuneration exceeding one million dollars unless it
specifically fits into the defined category of "performance-based compensation").
30. IRC § 162(m).
31. Id.
32. See Jeffrey D. Korzenik, The Tax Code Encourages Big Wall Street Bonuses, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2009,
3:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/04/wall-street-bonuses-opinions-contributors_0204jeffrey
korzenik.html (describing how I.R.C. § 162(m) has not changed the culture of large Wall Street firms and may
in fact contribute to "higher volatility of share prices and stingier dividends.").
33. Remuneration, supra note 28, at 31 fig.3; see also INST. FOR GOVERNANCE, supra note 20, at 17 fig.2
(showing an upward trend in CEO and other top employees' median compensation).
34. Belinfanti, supra note 20, at 103.
35. Id.
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C. Does Incentive Pay Work? Evidence from the Corporate Sector
Thanks in part to I.R.C. Section 162(m) and other regulatory changes that have
encouraged U.S. public corporations to embrace incentive-based pay,16 we now have two
decades' extensive experience with pay for performance in the U.S. corporate sector.
What have we learned from this massive field experiment in human motivation?
Researchers have published numerous empirical studies examining how adopting
incentive pay plans at individual firms has influenced corporate performance. A few
studies have found that certain types of incentive compensation schemes seem to be
associated with slightly better stock performance measured over relatively short time
periods." Other studies, however, found little or no effect, or even negative effects."
Meanwhile, incentive pay has been statistically linked with opportunistic, unethical, and
even illegal executive behavior, including earning manipulations, accounting frauds, and
excessive risk-taking."
These results have led experts who have surveyed the empirical literature to
conclude that it provides little or no support for the claim that incentive plans reliably
contribute to better corporate performance.40 As legal scholar Michael Dorff wrote in his
recent book on executive compensation, "[Tlhere is no empirically demonstrable
relationship between firms' use of performance pay and their success in the
marketplace."4 ' Even economist Kevin Murphy-a long-time advocate for incentive
pay-has conceded that "although there is a plethora of evidence on dysfunctional
consequences of poorly designed pay programs, there is surprisingly little direct evidence
36. For example, in 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission began requiring mutual funds to
disclose how they were voting the shares held in their investment portfolios. Disclosure of Proxy Voting
Policies, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8188, 34-47305, IC-25922 (2003). Funds responded largely by
outsourcing their voting decisions to "investor advisory firms," such as the Institutional Shareholders Services
(ISS), which favors pay for performance schemes. DORFF, supra note 27 (manuscript at 126) (quoting ISS
guidelines stating that "pay-for-performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy").
37. See DORFF, supra note 27 (manuscript at 127) (describing the studies).
38. See id (manuscript at 128) (describing the studies and noting that many "found that performance pay
either has no effect or even hurts corporate results"); id. at 135 ("Many studies using different methodologies
have failed to find consistent evidence that performance pay significantly improves outcomes for
corporations."). There is an interesting case study in HP's experimental adoption of pay for performance at
several divisions, which was abandoned when "some anti-social behavior began to emerge." Belinfanti, supra
note 20, at 134.
39. See DORFF, supra note 27 (manuscript at 145-46) (describing studies linking performance-based pay
to poor risk controls, earnings management, and accounting restatements); Belinfanti, supra note 20, at 107-08
(discussing Morgan Stanley report that found pay for performance linked to "the manipulation of earnings, the
externalization of risks, and the use of aggressive accounting practices to inflate a company's stock price");
Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 96,
97 (2005) (discussing studies linking incentive pay to financial fraud and accounting restatements); see
generally Jared Harris & Philip Bromiley, Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and
Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation, 18 ORG. SCI. 350 (2007) (finding link between incentive
pay and misrepresentations); see also Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Meltdowns Caused by Compensatory Stock
Options, TAX NOTES 738-40 (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.4texas.edullaw/
faculty/calvinjohnson/meltdown comp.pdf (concluding that Section 162(m), by favoring options as
compensation, has increased the risk of corporate failures).
40. DORFF, supra note 27 (manuscript at 127-28).
41. Id. (manuscript at 128).
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that higher pay-performance sensitivities [in executive compensation plans] lead to
higher stock-price performance."42
But the story of pay for performance in modem Corporate America may be more
disappointing and disturbing even than is suggested by academic studies of incentive
plans at individual companies. To see why, let us look at the question from a higher
altitude. Optimal contracting theory predicts that, other things being equal, public
companies' dramatic shift toward incentive-based pay after the adoption of I.R.C. Section
162(m) should have significantly improved the performance and profitability of U.S.
companies and produced a corresponding increase in investor wealth. If pay for
performance were the panacea for poor corporate performance that optimal contracting
theory predicts it should be, the adoption of Section 162(m) and the subsequent shift in
compensation practices should have dramatically increased investor returns from holding
stock in public companies.
Those increased investor returns have been noticeably absent. As noted earlier, the
S&P 500 Index saw inflation-adjusted total annual returns averaging more than ten
percent over the four decades of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.4 3 During the 1990s,
average returns rose to 14.7%, exactly what one would expect to see after executive
compensation was first tied directly to share price." But these gains proved unsustainable.
The 2000s have been one of the worst decades for equity investors in history, with
inflation-adjusted total returns averaging negative 3.4% annually. 45 Meanwhile, even as
investor returns have plummeted, executive pay has increased. In 1991, two years before
the adoption of Section 162, the average CEO of a large public company received pay
approximately 140 times that of the average employee; today the ratio is approximately
300 times.46 The shift to performance-based pay has also been accompanied by a
disturbing outbreak of executive-driven corporate frauds, scandals, and failures at firms
like Enron, Worldcom, Countrywide, AIG, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, and JP
Morgan, all of which have or had pay-for-performance programs.47
D. Incentives and the Assumption ofSelfishness
Of course, the question of what contributes to performance in individual companies
and in the broader corporate sector is inevitably difficult and complex. Any discussion of
how the shift to pay for performance has affected American public companies must
inevitably remain speculative. Nevertheless, our collective experience with Section
162(m), combined with the unsettling results of academic studies, highlights just how
little hard evidence supports the notion that pay-for-performance compensation is the
42. Murphy, supra note I1, at 2539.
43. SIMPLE STOCK INVESTING, supra note 23.
44. Id
45. Id. More generally, using Dow Jones' S&P 500 Return Calculator (available at
http://dqydj.net/sp-500-retum-calculator), the author calculated that in the 20 years following the 1993 change
to the tax code to encourage "pay for performance' in public companies (January 1994 to December 2013), the
inflation-adjusted annual return to holding the S&P 500 and reinvesting dividends was 6.48 percent. This is
significantly less than the 7.02 annual return investors enjoyed in the preceding 40 years (January of 1954 to
December of 1993).
46. Belinfanti, supra note 20, at 107.
47. Id.
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panacea incentive contracting theory predicts it should be.
Yet, rather than question the wisdom of relying on ex ante incentives, many
policymakers and would-be reformers have responded to recent corporate crises and
scandals by calling for even more use of them. For example, before the 2008 credit crisis,
Harvard law professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried were prominent advocates for
tying executive pay to share price performance.4 8 Post-2008, after incentive pay was
identified as contributing to excessive risk-taking in financial firms, Bebchuk and Fried
now have shifted to emphasizing tying pay to "long-term" stock performance.49
Meanwhile, the ideology of incentive pay has seeped into other important public
debates. Experts urged the state of Georgia to adopt performance-based pay for teachers
on the theory that "[t]o improve outcomes, the state must try to replicate market
incentives.""o The result, we have since learned, may have been widespread cheating
among Georgia educators seeking to improve their students' test scores through the
simple method of erasing and correcting students' answers on tests." The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services has launched a series of initiatives to explore
using pay-for-performance systems for hospitals, physicians, and nursing homes.5 2 When
Bloomberg News bought Business Week magazine in 2009, Bloomberg's chief editor
announced that the company would start basing writers' compensation on objective
metrics like whether a story's publication changed stock market prices." Legal scholars
have even advocated using performance pay to motivate regulators.54
As in the case of corporate executives, the ideology of incentives is being embraced
in these areas despite the fact that there is little or no empirical evidence to demonstrate it
actually works." Perhaps we may eventually stumble upon a proven formula for using
48. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12 (decrying lack of connection between executive pay and stock
price performance).
49. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915,
1922-36 (2010). In prior work, Bebchuk and Fried had suggested corporate "myopia" was not a particularly
significant problem. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 12, at 214-15 (discussing different methods of
compensating corporate managers).
50. Noel D. Campbell & Edward J. Lopez, Paying Teachers for Advanced Degrees: Evidence on Student
Performance from Georgia, 24 J. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 33, 35 (2008); see also Victor Lavy, Using
Performance-Based Pay to Improve the Quality of Teachers, 17 FUTURE OF CHILD. 87, 88-89 (2007)
(discussing pay for performance in teachers' compensation).
51. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; infra note 117 and accompanying text.
52. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Medicare "Pay for Performance" Initiatives (Jan. 31, 2005).
53. Stephanie Clifford, An Uneasy Marriage of the Cultish and the Rumpled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010,
at B 1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/business/media/26bizweek.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
54. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1003, 1032 (2012) (arguing that bank regulators should be compensated via a pay-for-performance approach);
cf Sharon Hannes, Compensating for Executive Compensation: The Case for Gatekeeper Incentive Pay, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 385, 368 (2010) (proposing incentive pay for auditors).
55. See David N. Figlio & Lawrence Kenney, Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance, 91
J. PUB. EcoN. 901, 902 (2007) ("[T]here is no U.S. evidence of a positive correlation between individual
incentive systems for teachers and student achievement."); Dale B. Thompson, The Next Stage of Health Care
Reform: Controlling Costs by Paying Health Plans Based on Health Outcomes, 44 AKRON L. REV. 727, 736
(2011) ("A number of pay-for-performance experiments were tried in the early 2000s. The results were not
promising."). See, e.g., Meredith B. Rosenthal et al., Early Experience with Pay-for-Performance: From
Concept to Practice, 294 J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 1788, 1793 (2005) (analyzing the results of a pay for performance
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financial incentives to motivate optimal performance from business executives-as well
as doctors, teachers, journalists, and bureaucrats. There is reason to worry, however, that
for many of our most important jobs and industries, the quest to tie pay to performance is
quixotic at best, and destructive at worst. This is because optimal contracting theory rests
on another, deeply flawed theory: the homo economicus theory of rational, selfish
behavior.
Like most of economic theory, optimal contracting theory assumes that people are
fundamentally selfish actors."6 Even the most ardent enthusiasts of economics would
likely admit there are times people seem to show concern for others and for following
ethical rules. But optimal contracting theory assumes such departures from the homo
economicus model are relatively rare and random. According to the theory, it is safe to
presume employers and employees follow whatever course of action maximizes their
own payoffs. This presumption is why incentives need to be monetary (or at least
material), of significant magnitude, and predetermined ex ante. Only under these
conditions can an employer rely on a contract to get the best out of a selfish employee, or
the employee rely on a contract to make a selfish employer pay. Presumably, without
incentive contracts, each side will opportunistically exploit the other.
The remainder of this Article argues that this assumption is the Achilles' heel of
optimal contracting theory. In recent years, the homo economicus model has come under
critique with the rise of "behavioral economics," a school of economic thought that,
rather than simply assuming people act rationally and selfishly, looks to empirical
experiments to see how real people actually behave. Most contemporary work in
behavioral economics tends to focus on departures from rationality more than on
departures from selfishness." However, behavioral science also demonstrates that, just as
people often make choices that appear irrational, they also often make choices that seem
unselfish and conscientious. We turn next to examine what behavioral science teaches
about the phenomenon laymen call "conscience" and experts often call "unselfish
prosocial behavior." As we shall see, it teaches lessons that carry important implications
for the wisdom of relying on pay for performance.
III. UNSELFISH PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A PRIMER
Before beginning, it is important to emphasize that the words "unselfish" and
"prosocial" are used here to describe behavior and not emotions. We are talking about
study conducted in the health care industry); Meredith B. Rosenthal & Richard G. Frank, What Is the Empirical
Basis for Paying for Quality in Health Care?, 63 MED. CARE RES. & REv. 135, 151-53 (2006) (arguing that
pay-for-performance methods of compensation are not effective in the healthcare sector).
56. JOSEPH HENRICH ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND
ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES 8 (2004) (discussing how the homo
economicus model rests on a "selfishness axiom" that assumes "individuals seek to maximize their own
material gains ... and expect others to do the same"). Sometimes advocates for economic analysis try to soften
homo economicus' sharp comers by arguing that people seek to maximize not their own material wealth but
their "utility," and may get utility from helping others, following ethical rules, and so forth. I have explained at
length elsewhere how this stratagem robs economic analysis of usefulness and reduces it to a tautology with no
predictive power. STOUT, supra note 26, at 26-27.
57. STOUT, supra note 26, at 77-78.
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acts, not feelings.5 Thus, this Article will describe an action as "unselfish," "prosocial,""9
or "conscientious" whenever the actor sacrifices time, money, or some other valuable
resource to help or to avoid harming others or to follow ethical rules. This definition
encompasses acts of active altruism, like running into a burning building to save a
stranger. But it also applies to the more common phenomenon of "passive" altruism:
declining to exploit others' trust or vulnerability (e.g., refraining from shaking down
schoolchildren for lunch money).
Unselfish prosocial behavior is so omnipresent in American society that it often goes
unnoticed. For example, Americans watched with horror when their televisions showed
scores of New Orleans residents looting in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Few stopped
to marvel at the tens of thousands of New Orleans residents who were not looting. I have
explored at length elsewhere the many reasons why we tend not to see others' unselfish
behavior, including the nature of our language, various psychological quirks and biases,
and the training offered in today's colleges and universities.' However, another
important reason the effects of conscience can be difficult to spot in daily life is that
healthy societies tend to use extrinsic incentives to reinforce and promote prosocial
behaviors.' This makes it hard to conclude with certainty that apparently unselfish
behavior is driven at least in part by internal forces (conscience), and not only by fear of
negative external consequences. I have never taken lunch money from a kindergartner,
but it would be difficult for me to prove to a skeptic that it is conscience, and not fear of
arrest and prosecution, that deters me from doing so.
Luckily, we can see the effects of conscience clearly in the experimental laboratory.
In the lab, researchers control the environment in which behavior occurs. They can
eliminate the external influences and incentives that muddy the waters of everyday life.
Over the past half-century, behavioral scientists have taken advantage of this fact to
design an ingenious variety of experiments to test what human subjects do in situations
where self-interest, as measured by material gains and losses, conflicts with the interests
of others. The result is an enormous body of empirical data that tells us a surprising
amount about just how, when, and why conscience works. This Part surveys four basic
lessons that behavioral science teaches about the nature of conscience.
58. When I pass up a convenient opportunity to relieve a kindergartner of her lunch money, it is easy to
imagine any number of "selfish" subjective concerns that might motivate my restraint. I may want to avoid the
intemal pangs of guilt, seek the pleasant buzz of feeling virtuous, or simply avoid the fires of Hell. I might even
suffer from an inchoate, irrational fear that, no matter what precautions I take, my misdeed inevitably will be
detected. Whatever my subjective emotional state is, my objective behavior remains unselfish, in the sense I
have declined an opportunity to make myself materially better off. See generally STOUT, supra note 26, at 54-
55 (discussing the difference between unselfish behavior and unselfish emotions).
59. Acts do not always need to be unselfish to be prosocial. A selfish neurosurgeon who saves a dozen
lives a week to pay for her third sports car is acting prosocially, albeit in a self-serving fashion.
60. STOUT, supra note 26, at 45-71.
61. Unselfish prosocial behavior is often consistent with legal incentives because a variety of legal rules
are designed to promote prosocial behavior (e.g., criminal law, contract law, tort law). Similarly, many of the
acts of altruism we observe in daily life occur between people who are acquainted with each other and who
operate in the same community (the neighborhood, the workplace, the family). Thus, it is difficult to exclude
the possibility that apparently unselfish prosocial behavior is actually motivated by concern for future
consequences in the form of reciprocity or reputational loss. Id. at 65-66.
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A. Lesson 1: Conscience Exists and Most People Know It
One of the most useful experiments for studying prosocial behavior is an experiment
called a social dilemma game. A social dilemma resembles the familiar prisoner's
dilemma of game theory. However, where the archetypal prisoner's dilemma involves
two people, social dilemmas can be played by more (sometimes quite a few more)
players. As in the prisoner's dilemma, each player is asked to choose between a
"cooperative" strategy that helps the other players and a "defecting" strategy that
maximizes the player's own personal returns. As in the prisoner's dilemma, an individual
player always maximizes her personal payoffs by defecting, no matter what the other
players do. However, the group gets the greatest aggregate payoff if all of its members
cooperate.62
Over the past five decades, social scientists have published the results of hundreds of
social dilemma experiments played by people of varying ages and backgrounds drawn
from different cultures around the world."3 Many experiments were cleverly designed to
exclude any possibility that the players could rationally expect external rewards from
choosing cooperation over defection.' There is a zero percent probability that a rational,
selfish subject would cooperate in such games. Yet real people have a marked propensity
to cooperate in social dilemmas." As a rule of thumb, experimenters observe cooperation
rates typically averaging about 50%.66 This remarkable result has endured over nearly a
half-century of testing."
62. A common example is a "group contribution game." A group of n players-let us assume n is four-
is assembled and each player is given an initial stake of, say, $100. The players are told that they can choose
between keeping all their newfound cash or contributing some or all of it to a common investment pool. Players
are also told that any money contributed to the pool will be multiplied by some factor greater than one but less
than n (assume the money will be tripled), then redistributed equally among all the players-including an equal
share for players who did not contribute. The best individual strategy is to keep the $100, while also hoping to
receive an equal portion of the tripled funds that would result from any of the other players being foolish
enough to donate to the common pool. For example, if you keep your $100 and the other three players
contribute theirs, you end up with $325 (your original $100 plus $225 from the common pool). As a result, no
rational, selfish player will cooperate, and selfish players walk away with only $100 each. At the same time, the
best group outcome (and the best average individual outcome) requires universal cooperation. If all unselfishly
contributed, each would get $300 back. Thus, the rational pursuit of self-interest in a social dilemma ultimately
leaves both the group and its individual members worse off.
63. See, e.g., David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of
Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOc'Y 58, 62-73 (1995) (summarizing over 100 studies
done between 1958 and 1992); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. ECON.
PERSP. 187, 188-92 (1988) (summarizing studies); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-
Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (summarizing
studies). See also Simon Gachter, Human Pro-Social Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order 8-9, in
HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., forthcoming
2014) (manuscript on file with editors) (discussing a variant of the social dilemma called the public good game).
64. For example, experiments often use subjects who are strangers, who are told they will play the game
only once, and who play under anonymous double-blind conditions that ensure their choice of strategy
(cooperate or defect) will not be revealed to either the other players or the experimenter.
65. HENRICH ET AL., supra note 56, at 5 ("[T]here is no society in which experimental behavior is even
roughly consistent with the canonical model of purely self-interested actors . . .
66. Sally, supra note 63, at 62-63.
67. In fact, the very first reported prisoner's dilemma experiment run at the RAND Corporation during
the 1950s illustrated this phenomenon. The subjects were two RAND game theorists who had devoted their
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Such results demonstrate that unselfish prosocial behavior is common, even
endemic. Cooperating subjects in a social dilemma are choosing to serve others' interests
rather than just maximizing their own. They are demonstrating a form of conscience,
meaning that they are behaving as if they take account of more than just their own
personal payoffs in making decisions. What's more, not only is conscience endemic, but
most people know it is endemic. We can see this by comparing the results of two other
common experimental games designed to test prosocial behavior: the dictator game and
the ultimatum game.68
A dictator game is quite simple. Two subjects are asked to play and one subject (the
dictator) is given a sum of money, say $100. The dictator is then invited to divide the
$100 any way she chooses between herself and the second player. The second player gets
what the dictator offers, no more and no less. (This is why the first player is called the
dictator.) Interestingly, the majority of dictators in dictator games share at least some of
their $100 with the second player, despite the fact they receive no external reward for this
sacrifice.6 9 Dictators in dictator games thus demonstrate some degree of unselfish
prosociality (conscience), just as subjects in social dilemmas do.
But the results of dictator games become still more interesting when compared with
the results of a third experimental game that has been the subject of numerous studies: the
ultimatum game. Like a dictator game, an ultimatum game involves two players. One
player, called the "proposer," is given an initial stake of money: again, let us assume
$100. The proposer is then told that she can offer to share any portion she chooses-all, a
lot, a little, or nothing-with the second player. The second player, called the
"responder," then gets to make a choice of his own. He can accept the proposer's offer, in
which case the $100 will be divided as the proposer suggests. Or the responder can reject
the offer, in which case both players get nothing.
It is clear what homo economicus would do in an ultimatum game. The proposer
would offer the smallest possible amount of money (say, one dollar) and the responder
would accept this minimal amount. After all, a dollar is better than nothing and should be
accepted. Knowing this, no selfish proposer would offer more. Yet human subjects don't
play ultimatum games this way. When real people play ultimatum games, the proposer
usually offers the responder a substantial portion of the stake, often half." And if the
proposer does not do this, the responder frequently rejects the offer."
Revenge is sweet. In an ultimatum game, however, it carries a cost. A responder
who rejects any positive offer has made himself worse off in material terms than if he had
careers to studying rational selfishness. To the consternation of their colleagues, they showed a hearty
willingness to unselfishly cooperate with each other. John Nash, a RAND game theorist who would go on to
win a Nobel prize and become the subject of the Sylvia Nasar's biography, A Beautiful Mind, mused in a note to
his colleagues, "[o]ne would have thought them more rational." SYLVIA NASAR, THE LIFE OF MATHEMATICAL
GENIUS AND NOBEL LAUREATE JOHN NASH 119(1998).
68. See generally Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9
J. ECON. PERSP. 209 (1995) (describing experiments); Gachter, supra note 63, at 6 (same).
69. Camerer & Thaler, supra note 68, at 213.
70. See id. at 212 (summarizing studies that show a strong pattern of proposers offering 50% to
responders); Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCIENCE 1773
(2000) (concluding that most proposers offer 40-50% of the total sum, while about half of responders reject
offers below 30%).
71. Camerer & Thaler, supra note 68, at 210 ("Offers of less than 20 percent are frequently rejected.").
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accepted. Responders who reject positive offers in ultimatum games that they perceive as
"too low" are sacrificing, not to benefit another, but to harm her.72 This behavior is
sometimes called spite.73 Experimental proof of spite is interesting, but it becomes more
interesting when the results of ultimatum games are compared with the results of dictator
games. Offers in dictator games tend to be smaller than offers in ultimatum games."
Dictators share, but on average, they do not share as much as proposers in ultimatum
games do.
This pattern suggests not only that people typically expect some degree of prosocial
behavior from others, but also that they also believe other people typically expect some
degree of prosocial behavior from others. Such expectations explain both why responders
in ultimatum games incur a cost to punish a "too low" offer, and why proposers
(apparently anticipating such punishment) offer more in ultimatum games where
punishment is possible than in dictator games, where punishment is not possible.
The phenomenon of unselfish prosociality (conscience) thus affects human behavior
on at least two levels. At the first level, people sometimes sacrifice to benefit (and in
ultimatum games, to harm) others around them. At the second level, people expect that
other people will sometimes sacrifice to benefit (or harm) others, and they alter their own
behavior in reliance on this expectation."
B. Lesson 2: Social Context and the Jekyll-Hyde Syndrome
As we have just seen, experimental games demonstrate that the homo economicus
model of purely selfish behavior is incomplete and often misleading. But to develop a
better model that permits more accurate predictions for human behavior, we need to
know a bit more. Most obviously, we need to have some idea about when and why people
act unselfishly. To appreciate the nature of the problem, recall the 50% cooperation rate
typically observed in social dilemmas."6 This result supports the claim that people often
behave unselfishly. But it also supports the claim that people often behave selfishly. After
all, if people always showed concern for others, we would observe 100% cooperation
rates. What explains why some people cooperate when others don't, or why the same
72. There may be other forms of other-regarding behavior as well. People may not have only altruistic
revealed preferences (willingness to sacrifice to help others) and spiteful revealed preferences (willingness to
sacrifice to harm others), but also relative preferences (willingness to sacrifice to ensure that one enjoys a better
position relative to others). See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA
oF EXCESS 107-21 (1999) (discussing relative preferences). Although relative preferences are important in
explaining human behavior, they lie beyond the scope of this Article.
73. Spite involves harming another, but spiteful behavior may benefit third parties if it encourages
cooperative behavior within a group. As a result, spite can be described at an evolutionary level as a form of
altruism. See generally STouT, supra note 26, at 122-47 (discussing the evolution of prosociality).
74. Id. at 89.
75. This second observation can hold true even for individuals who are themselves purely selfish and
asocial. Consider the example of a purely selfish Jill who lacks a conscience and enters a contract with a
conscientious Jack. Purely selfish Jill might rationally choose to make herself vulnerable to Jack by performing
her part of the contract first, if she believes Jack will then unselfishly perform his part of the contract as well.
We might call this rational trust in Jack's conscience. Similarly, selfish Jill might refrain from taking
opportunistic advantage of Jack if she believes that Jack would react by spitefully sacrificing to punish her,
which we might call rational fear of Jack's vengeance.
76. Supra Part f.A.
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person may cooperate at one time and not at another?
Luckily, experimental gaming data again offers insight. In brief, most individuals'
decisions whether to behave conscientiously in any particular situation (that is, to
sacrifice to help or avoid harming others or to follow ethical rules), depends on
something we might call social context.
From a purely economic perspective, social dilemma, ultimatum, and dictator games
are highly standardized experiments that present subjects with fixed payoff functions
determined by the nature of the game itself (social dilemma, ultimatum, or dictator
game). But while the economic parameters of the games are fixed, researchers can run
these experiments under a wide variety of noneconomic conditions. Thus, researchers in
some experiments have requested that subjects either cooperate or defect;" have grouped
subjects according to their tastes for abstract art;" have allowed them to exchange
surnames;" and have raised or lowered the payoffs to other members of the group from
choosing cooperation over defection." One recent experiment even examined how
subjects behaved when playing social dilemmas in the presence of a dog."
None of these changes in social context change the economic structure of the games.
For example, in a social dilemma, a subject always maximizes her personal payoffs by
choosing defection over cooperation. Nevertheless, changes in social context produce
dramatic changes in observed behavior. In a pioneering meta-survey of over 100 reported
social dilemma experiments, David Sally found that researchers were able to elicit
cooperation rates ranging from a low of 5% to nearly 97%.1 To appreciate this
astonishing behavioral flexibility, recall that payoffs in a social dilemma are such that
rationally selfish players should always defect.
Social context appears such a powerful determinant of conscientious behavior that it
can trigger near-universal prosociality in some games, and near-universal selfishness in
others. Although researchers have identified several different social cues that seem to
trigger prosocial behavior, this Article will focus on four in particular that seem
especially relevant to understanding the effects of pay-for-performance compensation
plans: (1) instructions from authority; (2) perceptions of common "in-group" status; (3)
expectations regarding others' selfishness or unselfishness; and (4) magnitude of the
benefits to others from one's own unselfish action. Each deserves attention, for each has
proven consistently important in triggering prosocial behavior in experimental games,
77. See generally Sally, supra note 63, at 64 (stating that instructions can affect the decision whether to
defect or cooperate).
78. See Brent Simpson, Social Identity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 18 Rationality & Soc. 443,
448 (2006) (discussing studies).
79. See, e.g., Gary Chamess & Uri Gneezy, What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in
Dictator and Ultimatum Games (Aug. 16, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=292857
(finding that providing personal information increases cooperation); Gary Charness et al., Social Distance and
Reciprocity: An Internet Experiment (Nov. 2003), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=312141
(analyzing the interactions between people over the internet, and noting that social distance affects prosociality
negatively).
80. Sally, supra note 63, at 66.
81. Manager's Best Friend; Animal and Human Behaviour, ECONOMIST (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/l16789216 (reporting results of study that found that cooperation rates rose
when subjects were asked to play social dilemmas in the presence of a dog).
82. Sally, supra note 63, at 62.
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and each also maps onto a well-studied and fundamental aspect of human psychology
(obedience, in-group bias, imitation, and empathy). Moreover, as we will see in Part IV,
each carries important implications for our understanding of the behavioral effects of ex
ante incentives.
1. Instructions from Authority
One of the most consistent findings in human psychology is that people tend to do as
they are told. For example, in Stanley Milgram's infamous obedience experiments,
subjects were told to administer a potentially lethal electric shock to another human being
(in reality an actor pretending to be shocked). The vast majority did just that." Of course,
from a rational choice perspective, this was hardly surprising. After all, Milgram's
subjects were being paid to follow instructions. More interesting, subjects in social
dilemma games obey instructions to cooperate even though this means they get less
money. In his meta-survey, for example, Sally found that giving formal instructions to
cooperate raised cooperation rates by 34-40% compared to games where no instructions
were given." Conversely, formal instructions to defect increased defection by 20-33%."
If Stanley Milgram's experiments showed us the dark side of obedience, social
dilemmas show us a brighter side. People will often follow instructions to harm others.
But they also often follow instructions to help or to avoid harming others, even when this
requires some personal sacrifice.
2. Perceptions ofIn-Group Membership
A second social variable that influences whether and to what extent subjects act
prosocially in experimental games is whether researchers work to increase or decrease the
"social distance" between players in the games."6 For example, subjects in social
dilemmas cooperate more when they are allowed to see or to speak to each other," while
players in dictator games are more generous when they know the surnames of their fellow
players."
83. See generally Stanley Milgram, A Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
371 (1963). Milgram's results are surprising and disturbing only if we in fact expect subjects to act prosocially,
confirming that most people have consciences and that we know that most do.
84. Sally, supra note 63, at 78.
85. Id. People are so sensitive to directions from authority that they change their behavior in response to
mere hints about what the experimenter desires. In one social dilemma experiment, experimenters observed a
65% cooperation rate when subjects were told they were playing the "Community Game." Lee Ross & Andrew
Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND
KNOWLEDGE 103, 106-07 (Edward S. Reed et al. eds., 1996). Among similar subjects told they were playing
the "Wall Street Game," cooperation dropped to 30%. Id. Similar results have been observed in dictator games,
where dictators make larger offers when they are instructed to "divide" their stakes than when the experimenters
use the "language of exchange." See Camerer & Thaler, supra note 68, at 211-13 (providing an example).
86. See SToUT, supra note 26, at 100-02, 146 (discussing the role of in-group perceptions). See also
Elizabeth Hoffman et al., Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, 86 AM. ECON.
REv. 653, 653-60 (1996).
87. Sally, supra note 63, at 76, 78, and 83.
88. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. J.
ECON. 817 (2002).
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Although this sort of in-group bias is sometimes associated with relatively
immutable characteristics like racial or ethnic identity, perceptions of group membership
are flexible and highly manipulable. In the famous "Robbers Cave" experiments
organized at an Oklahoma summer camp for boys in the 1950s, sociologist Muzafer
Sherif first created animosity and conflict between two otherwise similar groups of boys,
and then eased the tension between the groups by forcing them to work together toward
common goals. 9 Similarly, experimenters have been able to manipulate cooperation rates
in social dilemmas by creating subgroup identities among players."
3. Beliefs About Others' Prosociality
A third social variable that seems to play a key role in eliciting unselfish behavior
from subjects in experimental games is beliefs about whether others are acting, or would
act, unselfishly. Not surprisingly, people tend to imitate what other people do. This
includes acting nice when we think others would act nicely, and acting nasty when we
think they would act nasty. Thus in dictator game experiments, dictators share more of
their loot when they are given information indicating that other dictators in other games
chose to share." Similarly, numerous social dilemma studies indicate that subjects'
beliefs about how others are likely to behave strongly influence their own choices.
Experimenters have found that subjects who believe that their fellow players in a social
dilemma experiment are likely to defect become far more likely to defect themselves.
Conversely, players who are led to believe their fellows will cooperate become more
likely to choose cooperation."
This last pattern is an especially striking example of how social considerations
dominate economic concerns in experimental games, because in a social dilemma,
believing one's fellows are likely to cooperate actually increases the expected economic
returns from defecting. Nevertheless, far from discouraging cooperation, a belief that
other players are going to cooperate produces more cooperation-exactly the opposite of
what the homo economicus model predicts.
There are a number of possible explanations for why people tend to imitate others."
For example, in the context of some experimental games, a belief that others would
cooperate may reinforce in-group perceptions of the type discussed immediately above.
Whatever the mechanism, perceptions about others' prosociality seem to be important
89. See generally MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS
CAVE EXPERIMENT (1961).
90. Sally, supra note 63, at 78 (stating that "subgroup identity decreases the probability of cooperation").
91. Erin Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro-Social
Behavior, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 307, 313-14 (2009).
92. Scott T. Allison & Norbert L. Kerr, Group Correspondence Biases and the Provision of Public
Goods, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 688, 688 (1994) (citation omitted) ("Numerous studies have
reported that individuals are more likely to cooperate when they expect other group members to cooperate than
when they expect others to defect."); Gicther, supra note 63, at 20 (discussing role of conformist behavior in
determining cooperation); Toshio Yamagishi, The Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas, in 3 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 51, 64-65 (1986) (discussing experimental findings that
"[e]xpectations about other members' behavior is one of the most important individual factors affecting
members' decisions in social dilemmas").
93. See generally STOuT, supra note 26, at 106-10 (discussing imitation).
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triggers for one's own prosocial behavior."
4. Magnitude ofBenefits to Others
Finally, a fourth social variable that influences behavior in experimental games is
the magnitude of the payoffs to others from one's own unselfish behavior. Although this
may on first inspection seem an economic variable, it is also a social variable; we are
talking about economic returns to others, a subject of indifference to homo economicus.
Real people, however, are more inclined to cooperate when they believe others benefit a
lot, and not just a little, from their cooperation.
This has been seen in dictator games, where an experimenter's promise to double or
triple the amount the dictator chooses to share has made some dictators so generous that
their partners ended up with bigger payoffs than the dictators themselves." Similarly, in
explaining cooperation rates, Sally's meta-analysis of social dilemmas concluded that
"the size of the loss to the group if strictly self-interested choices are made instead of
altruistic ones . .. is important and positive.""6
Concern about the size of benefits to others may be driven by empathy-the
capacity to care about what happens to others, and not only to what happens to ourselves.
Neoclassical economic theory does not quite know what to do with empathy.
Nevertheless, it is a well-recognized and well-studied psychological phenomenon that
may play an important role in determining when we do or do not behave in an unselfish,
prosocial fashion.97
5. Conclusion: Understanding the Jekyll-Hyde Syndrome
Taken as a whole, the experimental gaming data thus offers us a second, potentially
very useful, lesson about prosocial behavior. In brief, most people act as if they have at
least two personalities (or, as an economist might put it, two "revealed preference
functions"). One personality is purely selfish. When this personality dominates, we
maximize our personal payoffs without regard to how our choices affect others. Most
people, however, have a second and more prosocial personality. When our prosocial
personality dominates, we take account of others' interests, at least to some extent.
The result somewhat resembles the fictional protagonist of Robert Louis
Stevenson's tale, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." Sometimes we are
caring, conscientious, and considerate of others' welfare (Dr. Jekyll). Sometimes we are
selfish and asocial (Mr. Hyde). Which persona dominates in any particular situation
seems determined largely by social context. And four of the most important aspects of
social context are: instructions from authority; perceptions of in-group identity;
94. Some social scientists call this "generalized reciprocity." However, mutual cooperation in a one-shot,
anonymous social dilemma cannot be true reciprocity because there is no rational hope that choosing
cooperation could elicit benefits from others in future games. Nor can the recipient in a dictator game
reciprocate the dictator's generosity. Thus, imitation seems a better word to describe such behavior.
95. See James Andreoni & John Miller, Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism, 70 ECONOMETRICA 737, 745 (2002).
96. Sally, supra note 63, at 79.
97. STOUT, supra note 26, at 110-14 (discussing empathy).
98. ROBERT Louis STEVENSON, THE STRANGE CASE OF DR. JEKYLL AND MR. HYDE (1886).
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expectations regarding others' prosociality; and perceived benefits to others.
This is not to say that when the social cues are lined up favorably, people always act
prosocially. As will be discussed in greater detail, individuals differ in their proclivities
toward conscientious behavior, and a blessedly small minority of psychopaths seem to
lack any conscience at all.99 But as we are about to see, even the most conscientious seem
to take account of personal cost in choosing between selfish and unselfish behavior.
C. Lesson 3: Prosociality and Personal Cost
Experiments have proven that social context plays a vital role in determining when
people act in an unselfish, prosocial fashion. But saying that social context matters does
not imply that economic context does not. A third fundamental lesson from experimental
gaming is that prosocial behavior depends not only on social context, but personal
payoffs as well.
Although people behave far more unselfishly than standard economic theory
suggests, the supply of unselfish behavior seems (as an economist might put it) to be
"downward-sloping." This means that as the cost of acting unselfishly increases, the
quantity of unselfish behavior supplied declines. This phenomenon is perhaps most easily
observed in social dilemma games. As the personal cost associated with cooperating in a
social dilemma rises (that is, as the expected gains from defecting increase), the incidence
of cooperation drops significantly. Sally's meta-survey found that doubling the reward
from defecting decreased average cooperation rates in social dilemmas by as much as
16%. '1 Similarly, when proposers offer relatively larger shares in an ultimatum game, the
likelihood that responders will spitefully reject it decreases. "o
We seem more inclined to unselfishness when unselfishness is cheap. Conversely,
when the cost of conscience is high, we are less inclined to "buy" it. It is important to
emphasize this is not the same as saying people are basically selfish. Any cooperation in a
social dilemma, and any sharing in an ultimatum or dictator game, is inconsistent with the
homo economicus model. But when people indulge in conscience, they keep at least one
eye on self-interest in doing so.102
This means that if we want to promote conscientious behavior, we need to give
conscience breathing room to work. George Washington supposedly said few men have
the honor to withstand the highest bidder. He may have been on to something:
experimental gaming suggests that if we want people to be good, it is important not to
99. See infra Part BI.D (discussing proclivity toward conscientious behavior and the role of character in
altruism).
100. Sally, supra note 63, at 75.
101. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. Although this pattern may be driven in part by
responders' perceptions that proposers who offer larger shares are behaving more "fairly" and do not deserve
punishment, it is also consistent with fact that as the size of the proposer's offer increases, so does the personal
cost of spitefully rejecting the offer.
102. This does not mean unselfish behavior is economically unimportant. Acts of unselfishness that cost
the unselfish actor relatively little can provide much larger benefits to others. (Anyone who has had a computer
or wallet stolen can appreciate that the costs they would have avoided if these items had not been stolen
outweigh the benefit to the thief.) Summed up by many different individuals and for many different social
interactions, the total gains from such small acts of altruism can be enormous. Thus, even a limited human
capacity for unselfish action generates enormous benefits over long periods and for large populations.
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tempt them too much to be bad. As we shall see in Part IV, this carries important
implications for the modem ideology of incentives.
D. Lesson 4: The Role of Character
Finally, we turn to a fourth important lesson to be learned from behavioral
experiments: although almost everyone is capable of unselfish action, a very small
percentage of the population seems not to be, and the rest of us vary in our inclinations
toward unselfishness. In other words, while unselfish behavior is determined in large part
by social context and personal cost, it is also related to what laymen might call character.
The most obvious example can be found in psychopaths. Psychopaths (sometimes
called sociopaths) are relatively rare individuals who, for reasons of nature or nurture,
seem incapable of acting unselfishly or showing empathy for others. (Not to put too fine a
point on it, it can be argued that homo economicus is a psychopath.) Luckily, only about
one to three percent of the population is estimated to suffer "antisocial personality
disorder" (the formal psychiatric label for psychopathy), and many of those individuals
are safely confined in prison. o0
The rest of us are capable of acting unselfishly, at least in the right circumstances.
Recall that experimenters have observed cooperation rates of over 97% in some social
dilemmas, and sharing rates of 100% have been observed in some dictator games
(presumably dictator games without any psychopathic subjects).'" When the stars are
aligned-when social context supports unselfishness and the personal cost of acting
unselfishly is not too high-conscience seems a near-universal behavioral phenomenon.
But in real life, the stars are not always aligned. Sometimes social context is
ambiguous, and sometimes large temptations raise their heads. In ambiguous or tempting
circumstances, different individuals show different propensities to act conscientiously.
Gender seems to play a role in some experimental games, as does religion, although both
variables have only modest and quirky effects."'o Another significant demographic
variable may be age. Prosocial behavior in games increases throughout childhood and
young adulthood, and some evidence exists that the process of becoming more prosocial
continues with age'" (stereotypes of grumpy old men to the contrary).
But in addition to such relatively weak demographic variables, intriguing evidence
suggests that one's proclivity toward prosociality-one's "character"-may be in large
part a product of one's experience.
In 2004, a consortium of behavioral scientists published the results of a large study
of social dilemma, ultimatum, and dictator games played by subjects from 15 small, non-
Western hunting, herding, fishing, and farming cultures around the globe."' The
consortium found that people of all ages, genders, and backgrounds-Machiguenga
subsistence farmers from the rainforests of South America, Torguud nomads in
Mongolia, Lamalera whale-hunters in Indonesia-routinely behaved in an unselfish,
103. STOUT, supra note 26, at 47-48.
104. Id. at 98.
105. Id. at 100.
106. HENRICH ET AL., supra note 56, at 5.
107. Id. at 10.
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prosocial fashion in playing the games.'os As the researchers put it, "[T]here is no society
in which experimental behavior is even roughly consistent with the canonical model of
purely self-interested actors."'"
Nevertheless, there were clear differences between cultures. For example,
Machiguenga on average contributed 22% in social dilemmas, while the more generous
Orma cattle-herders of Kenya contributed 58%."o The researchers also found that
individual demographic variables-such as gender and wealth-did a poor job of
predicting behavior."' Rather, behavior seemed driven by social experiences, and
especially by whether the culture was one in which people frequently engaged in market
transactions with strangers (like hiring themselves out for wages) and whether economic
production required people to cooperate with non-kin (whale-hunters necessarily
cooperate a lot, while slash-and-burn subsistence farmers need to cooperate very little)."'
The researchers concluded, "Our data suggest that these between-group behavioral
differences . . . are the product of the patterns of social and economic interaction that
frame the everyday lives of our subjects.""' In layman's terms, character may be largely a
product of experience.
But whatever the underlying cause of differences in individuals' inclinations toward
prosociality, it seems clear that individual variations exist. This last lesson will prove
important as we investigate what behavioral science teaches about the likely
consequences of the ideology of incentives.
IV. THE UNINTENDED BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
As we have seen, the optimal contracting literature presumes people are self-
seeking, opportunistic actors who will shirk (if they are agents) or renege on promises to
pay (if they are principals) unless constrained by enforceable contracts that provide the
correct ex ante incentives. As we have also seen, real people often depart from this
behavioral model. Business firms, school systems, and medical centers must deal with
real people. Thus, this Part explores the question: what does behavioral science tell us
about the real behavioral consequences of using ex ante incentives?
A. Relational Contracts and Contractual Incompleteness
The fundamental nature of this question becomes apparent once we recognize, as
contracts experts do, that it is impossible to design a truly "optimal" agency contract that
always creates perfect incentives."4 Like other contracts, employment contracts are
108. Id. at 5, 14-15 tbl.2.1.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 23 tbl.2.3.
111. HENRICH ET AL., supra note 56, at 28.
112. Id. at 33, 49.
113. Id. at 45.
114. See generally Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1641 (2003) (observing that all contracts must be to some degree incomplete); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755, 776 (1988) (discussing how contracting
parties are "forced to write an incomplete contract because of their inability to specify the state of the world in
sufficient detail that an outsider can verify whether it has occurred").
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always incomplete, meaning they do not address all the potential issues or disputes that
might arise in the future between the parties. For example, an employment contract
between parents and a babysitter might address the sitter's hourly wage and the number
of hours of work to be provided. However, the contract is unlikely to address what should
happen if the child wanders off and becomes lost, or if the child scrawls on the sitter's
shoes with indelible markers, or if the parents return home hours late due to some
emergency.
Contracts are incomplete for good reasons. One is that humans aren't omniscient. As
Melvin Aron Eisenberg has put it, "Contracts concern the future, and are therefore always
made under conditions of uncertainty."" Problems can arise during performance that
neither party thought of, much less discussed in the contract. For example, a bank might
hire a derivatives trader only to have the position become obsolete as a result of
unexpected financial reform legislation.
Complexity also leads to incompleteness because complexity makes negotiating and
drafting contracts expensive. When a corporation hires a CEO, even if the parties could
anticipate every issue that might arise in the course of managing the business-from a
sudden advance in production technology to a nationwide quarantine due to a flu
pandemic-they might find that attempting to draft a formal contract that addressed each
and every possible contingency is prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. Instead,
they might prefer a short, incomplete contract that addresses only the most important and
obvious aspects of the employment relationship (e.g., responsibilities and salary) and
leaves other matters to be dealt with in the future, should they arise."'
Finally, contracts are often intentionally incomplete about matters that, while
important to the parties, are difficult to observe or to prove in court. For example,
suppose a New York City school teacher's contract provides for a performance bonus if
the teacher's students achieve certain test scores. Suppose further that the contract
specifically provides no bonus will be paid if students' scores rise because the teacher
tampered with the students' answer sheets. Even if (as allegedly happened in Georgia)'" a
statistical analysis of student answer sheets showed improved test scores, but also a
suspiciously high number of changed and corrected test answers, it would be difficult and
expensive, and perhaps impossible, for the school district to determine whether the
teacher or the students changed the answers-much less prove the matter in court.
Because uncertainty, complexity, and unobservability are endemic, incomplete
contracts are everywhere. Even a relatively simple agency contract-say, a contract with
a real estate broker to sell a house-contains gaps. What if the homeowner thinks the
agent is not marketing the home as enthusiastically as he should? As Steven Shavell puts
it, "Contracts typically omit all manner of variables and contingencies that are of
potential relevance to contracting parties.""' Contracts scholar Robert Scott goes further:
115. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211,
213 (1995).
116. Similarly, uncertainty and complexity can defeat a court's attempt to provide optimal "implied"
contractual terms. STOUT, supra note 26, at 179-82.
117. Steve Osunsami & Ben Forer, Atlanta Cheating: 178 Teachers and Administrators Changed Answers
to Increase Test Scores, ABC NEWS (July 6, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/us/atlanta-cheating-178-teachers-
administrators-changed-answers-increase/story?id=14013113.
118. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 63 (2004).
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"All contracts are incomplete.""'
But some contracts are more incomplete than others. Contracts fall along a spectrum
of completeness. At one end lie "discrete" contracts-simple contracts for exchanges
between parties who never expect to deal with each other again. A contract to purchase a
laptop computer from an online catalog is an example of a relatively discrete contract. At
the other end of the spectrum lie "relational" contracts that involve complex, long-term,
uncertain exchanges-for example, a contract to employ a teacher, surgeon, or business
executive.12 0 Drastic incompleteness is a hallmark of most employment contracts. An
empirical study of Fortune 500 CEOs, for example, found that nearly a third had no
written employment contract at all, and another third had only bare-bones contracts that
spelled out their pay and incentives but few of their duties.12
This observation raises the question of how relational contracts, including many and
possibly most employment contracts, can work. Purely selfish actors can be counted upon
to opportunistically exploit the gaps in relational contracts and perform poorly or not at
all. Anticipating this, purely selfish actors would avoid relational exchanges with other
purely selfish actors.'22 Yet, real people do enter incomplete relational contracts. In fact,
many of our most economically significant exchanges-joint business ventures,
apartment leases, building contracts, and of course employment agreements-are
relational. Somehow, despite the problems of uncertainty, complexity, and
unobservability, relational exchanges take place. How?
Sometimes, opportunistic behavior in relational contracts can be discouraged by fear
of loss of reputation. As organizational economist Oliver Williamson has put it (with
typical academic style), "reputation effects attenuate incentives to behave
opportunistically in interfirm trade-since the immediate gains from opportunism in a
regime where reputation counts must be traded off against future costs."'2 3 But as
Williamson has also noted, "[T]he efficacy of reputation effects is easily overstated ...
."124 There are good reasons to question whether reputation can always, or even often,
motivate purely selfish actors not to act opportunistically in relational exchanges. For
example, reputation becomes an unreliable guarantee as one nears retirement. (This does
not seem to deter corporations from hiring executives and directors in their fifties, sixties,
and seventies.) It can also be hard for outside observers to determine which party was at
fault when a relational deal breaks down; for example, there was widespread public
disagreement over the wisdom-or folly-of Hewlett-Packard's 2010 decision to fire
CEO Mark Hurd.'25
119. Scott, supra note 114, at 1641.
120. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 877 (2000) (discussing relational contracts); Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of
Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas oflan Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 (2000) (same).
121. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts:
What Do Top Executives Bargain For? 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 240-41 (2006).
122. STOuT, supra note 26, at 183-84 (discussing the difficulties of relational contracting between purely
self-interested actors).
123. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 116 (1996).
124. Id.
125. See Ashlee Vance, Oracle Chief Faults HP. Board for Forcing Hurd Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2010,
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/technology/lohewlett.htmldbk (noting Oracle CEO Larry Ellison's critique of
the H.P. board's decision to force Hurd out).
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B. Conscience As a Solution to Contractual Incompleteness
Given the limits of formal contracts and reputation, how can purely selfish actors
participate successfully in relational exchange? Maybe purely selfish actors cannot-at
least, not with other purely selfish actors. However, the empirical evidence on
prosociality suggests another possibility. Although conventional economic analysis treats
contract law as a vehicle for allowing self-interested actors to bind themselves to perform
their promises, the story of relational contract may be just the opposite-not a tale of self-
interest, but a story of prosocial partners who trust each other and, to at least some extent,
look out for each other.
The key to understanding this idea is to understand that when two people
contemplate entering a relational contract, each wants protection against the possibility
that the other might opportunistically exploit the many gaps that necessarily exist in the
contract. Neither the parties nor the courts can reliably fill the gaps because of
uncertainty, complexity, and unobservability. Reputational concerns sometimes can
check opportunistic behavior, but reputation alone often is not enough. So, parties
entering a relational contract may seek to employ a third possible check on
opportunism-their contracting partner's conscience. 2 6
Suppose, for example, some unanticipated problem or opportunity arises while two
parties are performing a contract. Where two purely selfish actors would instantly find
themselves locked in conflict over who should bear the loss or claim the gain, prosocial
partners could resolve the question far more easily-say, by splitting the unanticipated
gain or loss-because they share, to at least some extent, the common goal of promoting
their mutual (not only individual) welfare. Nor do prosocial partners need to reduce every
detail of their bargain to writing. They trust each other to focus on performing, not on
selfishly searching for loopholes. Finally, even when some element of performance is
unobservable or unverifiable, prosocial partners will try to hold up their end of the deal.
In brief, an implicit "term" of relational contracts seems to be that each party agrees
that, in performing, she will suppress her Mr. Hyde personality and adopt a Jekyll-like
attitude toward her counterparty. As Ian Macneil has put it, a relational contract is just
that-a relationship-characterized by (among other attributes) "role integrity,"
"flexibility," and "reciprocity."' 2 7 Using the language of behavioral science, a relational
contract creates a social context that promotes unselfish prosocial behavior. The spectrum
from simple discrete contracts to complex, incomplete relational contracts, accordingly,
can be viewed as a spectrum from Hydish behavior toward one's counterparty, to
Jekyllish behavior.
This approach offers a number of insights into the questions of how relational
exchanges really work, and how contract law and contract lawyers can make them work
126. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1735 (2001) (discussing how trust can fill gaps in
incomplete contracts); STOUT, supra note 26, at 185-88 (same). For empirical evidence, see generally Martin
Brown et al., Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Market Interactions (Inst. for Empirical Research
in Econ., Working Paper No. 38, 2002), available at heetp://www.iew.uzh.ch/wp/iewwp038.pdf; Peter Kollock,
The Emergence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust, 100
Am. J. Soc. 313 (1994) (investigating the roles of reputation and social exchanges in the relationships).
127. Macneil, supra note 120, at 897.
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better.128 But it carries especially important implications for ex ante incentive contracts.
This is because the behavioral evidence indicates that employment contracts that rely on
material incentives to motivate performance suppress the vital force of conscience-
essential for relational contracting-and encourage undesirably selfish, opportunistic, and
even illegal behavior. Incentive pay does this through at least three separate but mutually
reinforcing mechanisms: (1) by changing perceptions of social context in ways that
encourage selfishness; (2) by creating material temptations that can extinguish
conscience; and (3) by introducing selection bias against individuals with relatively
prosocial characters.
C. Social Context and Crowding Out
Let us first consider how pay-for-performance contracts frame social context. As
discussed in Part III, when choosing between asocial and prosocial behavior, people pay
close attention to social context. Contract negotiations provide a social context that can
be ambiguous. Is the contract in question a discrete contract, in which case mutually
selfish behavior may be appropriate and expected? Or is it a relational contract calling for
trust, cooperation, and mutual regard for each other's interests? In extreme cases (buying
a car versus negotiating a prenuptial agreement) the distinction is clear. But in many
other cases, including employment contracts, the contract may have both discrete and
relational elements.
In an ambiguous situation, an actor who wants to rely on her contract partner's
conscience wants to signal as clearly as possible that performance calls for mutually
considerate, rather than arm's length, behavior. Yet what signal does an employer send
when it uses ex ante incentive contracts to motivate its employees? The pay-for-
performance approach inevitably signals that the employer in question views the
employment relationship as an arm's length exchange in which self-interested behavior is
appropriate, expected, and even encouraged. This is likely to induce the behavioral
phenomenon social scientists call "crowding out."'2 9
In one classic study of crowding out, researchers studied ten day-care centers where
parents occasionally arrived late to pick up their children, forcing the teachers to stay
after closing time. 3 ' The researchers convinced six of the centers to introduce a new
policy of fining the parents who arrived late.'' The result? Late arrivals increased
significantly.'32 In another famous study, people were asked to donate blood either for
free, or for a modest payment. More people agreed to donate blood for free than for
cash. "
From an economic perspective, these are bizarre results. How can raising the price
of an activity prompt people to purchase more of it, or paying people to do something
128. See generally STOUT, supra note 26, at 175-99 (discussing acceptance of incentive ideology).
129. See generally Frey & Osterloh, supra note 39, at 102-06 (discussing crowding out theory and
evidence).
130. See generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 11(2000).
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id.
133. Carl Mellstrm & Magnus Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J.
EUR. ECON. Ass'N 845, 852-56 (2008).
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cause them to do it less? The answer, according to crowding out theory, is that
associating a particular kind of behavior or interaction with monetary payments changes
the social context, making the interaction look like a market transaction in which purely
selfish behavior is deemed appropriate. Thus, fining parents who arrived late to the day-
care center signaled that lateness was not a social faux pas, but a market decision parents
were free to make without worrying about teachers' welfare. Similarly, paying people to
donate blood signals that donation is a voluntary decision to sell personal property, rather
than a social obligation to contribute to group welfare. By emphasizing external material
incentives, day-care center fines and blood donation payments crowd out internal
"incentives" like guilt and empathy.'"
For similar reasons, incentive pay can be expected to crowd out less-selfish
employee motives like trust, loyalty, and commitment. This is because emphasizing
material incentives manipulates each of the four social cues we have examined-
instructions from authority, perceptions of common group membership, beliefs about
others' prosocial or asocial behavior, and perceptions of benefits to others-in a fashion
that promotes selfishness.' First, offering a material incentive to induce an employee to
perform a particular act inevitably sends the unspoken signal that the employer believes
the employee would not otherwise perform; in other words, the employer expects selfish
behavior and indeed views it as appropriate to the task at hand. Second, traditional
incentive-pay schemes undermine a sense of group identity and common fate because
they encourage individuals to believe their compensation and success is tied only to their
own efforts, rather than the group. Third, when pay-for-performance schemes are used
widely in an organization, they support the perception that other employees are likely to
behave selfishly (not to mention signaling the selfishness of the employer, who proposes
to withhold compensation regardless of circumstances unless its performance metrics are
met). Fourth, pay-for-performance schemes imply that the employee's selfishness
actually benefits the employer. Otherwise, why would it be rewarded?
Understanding how incentive pay reframes social context and crowds out ethics and
conscience offers insight into what Bradley Birkenfeld might have been trying to say
when he told the judge that UBS had "incentivized" him to help its clients evade paying
taxes."' Birkenfeld probably was not suggesting he was excused from breaking the law
simply because he received a material benefit from doing so; surely, he realized no judge
would be sympathetic to the notion that self-interest justifies illegality. Rather, Birkenfeld
was saying that, by incentivizing its employees to help its clients evade taxes, UBS had
created a social context that gave him permission to do so.
Incentive contracts, it turns out, do more than change behavior. At a very deep level
they change motivations. Emphasizing self-interest turns out to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. By treating people as if they care only about their own material rewards, we
ensure that they do.3 7
134. The framing effects of monetary exchange are so powerful that merely earning money playing a game
of Monopoly makes experimental subjects less likely to help a researcher pick up "accidentally" dropped
pencils immediately afterwards. MARGARET HEFFERNAN, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: WHY WE IGNORE THE
OBVIOUs AT OUR PERIL 186-87 (2011).
135. STOUT, supra note 26, at 249-52.
136. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
137. See generally STOUT, supra note 26, at 247-52 (discussing how emphasizing selfishness as a motive
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D. Conscience, Temptation, and Cognitive Dissonance
Even if only at an intuitive level, many employers recognize the value of creating a
workplace that promotes employee trustworthiness and loyalty, and (incentive schemes
notwithstanding) they attempt to manipulate social context to promote unselfish
employee behavior. The strategy can be as simple as posting a sign that reads, "Customer
Service Is Our Priority," or as elaborate as sponsoring week-long corporate retreats where
executives listen to motivational speakers and go white-water rafting together.
What is probably less well recognized, however, is that even the most careful effort
to create a workplace that supports conscientiousness and prosociality can run aground on
the rock of employee self-interest. This is because, as we have seen, conscience works
best when it does not conflict too directly with self-interest. Unlike Oscar Wilde, most of
us can resist small temptations. It is the big ones that do us in.
Pay-for-performance schemes can create very big temptations indeed. This is
especially true in corporate environments, because a hallmark of the American public
corporation is that it permits the accumulation of enormous wealth.' Incentive contracts
based on metrics subject to executives' influence, especially metrics that executives can
manipulate or falsify, create tempting opportunities for executives to try to extract this
wealth for themselves through behavior that imposes costs on the corporation or on third
parties."' In effect, once corporate directors agree to compensate executives with ex ante
incentive contracts, the board has effectively ceded a great deal of control over the firm's
assets to the executives themselves. To the extent the incentive contracts are
incomplete-as all incentive contracts must be-they also inevitably present executives
with opportunities to try to expropriate corporate assets through opportunistic, illegal, or
otherwise undesirable behavior.
Thus, corporate employers that rely primarily on ex ante material incentives to
motivate their employees are playing a dangerous game. It is almost always possible, and
sometimes far easier, for an executive to meet a performance metric through unethical or
illegal behavior rather than hard work. For example, in the case of Enron, executive stock
option grants intended to motivate employees to "maximize shareholder wealth" in fact
motivated them to commit a massive accounting fraud. As Franklin Raines, then-CEO of
Fannie Mae, described the causes of the Worldcom and Enron scandals in an interview in
Business Week: "[Y]ou put enough money in front of people, good people will do bad
things."'4 0 Employees who would never think of shoplifting or other small acts of larceny
will ignore the voice of conscience if the opportunity for a hugely profitable fraud comes
increases the incidence of selfishness).
138. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387 (2003) (discussing a corporation's capacity to
own and accumulate assets).
139. For example, incentive contracts that allow executives to personally profit from increased profits
create incentives for those executives to cause the firm to load up on risk. In a survey of 562 risk managers,
compensation practices were identified as a chief cause of banking failures. HEFFERNAN, supra note 134, at
189.
140. Executive Compensation Hearing, supra note 5, at 221. One of the great ironies of Raines' testimony
was that he was subsequently sued for manipulating Fannie Mae's financial statements in order to maximize his
own incentive pay. The parties settled the suit. James R. Hagerty, Fannie Mae Ex-Officials Settle, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 19, 2008, at A3.
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along. Thus, a workplace that relies on large material incentives to motivate employees is
also a workplace that suppresses the force of conscience.
Moreover, once otherwise honest individuals succumb to temptation and indulge in
unethical or illegal behavior, they become more likely to cross ethical lines again in the
future, and more easily. It is a truism among those who study business frauds that white-
collar offenders usually start with small violations, before escalating into full-blown
criminality. Many psychologists believe the reason has to do with the phenomenon
known as cognitive dissonance. 4 ' Cognitive dissonance theory posits that people desire
consistency between their beliefs and their actual behavior. When their actions become
inconsistent with their attitudes, rather than change their behavior, they tend to change
their attitudes by rationalizing their actions to restore apparent consistency. The result is
that when incentives tempt people to do things they are otherwise reluctant to do, they
respond to the inconsistency between their beliefs ("I should not do this") and their
behavior ("I did this") by changing their beliefs ("Since I did this, it must be something
okay to do").
Thus, "induced compliance" shifts people's views about the appropriateness of their
own conduct because "in the battle between changing one's attitude and changing one's
behaviour, attitudes are the easiest to change."'4 2 Once incentive pay tempts employees
into opportunistic or illegal behavior, they change their beliefs about what is
"opportunistic" or "illegal" so they can continue thinking of themselves as fundamentally
ethical and law-abiding. This change makes it much easier for them to justify similar
unethical or illegal behavior to themselves in the future.
Pay-for-performance schemes accordingly can create criminogenic environments
that first tempt honest individuals into unethical or illegal behavior, then invite them to
adopt looser views about what is unethical or illegal in the first place. It is sometimes said
in the business world that pressure makes diamonds. We should bear in mind it also
makes felons.
E. Selection Bias and the Question of Character
Thus far we have focused on how incentive pay discourages prosocial behavior in
individuals who are fully and equally capable of acting prosocially. As noted earlier,
however, experimental gaming demonstrates that individuals differ substantially in their
inclinations toward prosocial action.'4 3 Few of us are psychopaths, utterly without
conscience. Nevertheless, some people are more inclined toward conscientious behavior
than others are. This too has implications for the wisdom of using incentive contracts.
In particular, because contracts are incomplete, most incentive contracts create
opportunities for employees to try to reap rewards through behavior that technically
satisfies the contracts but is illegal, unethical, or not truly in the employers' interests. To
the extent this is true, we can expect employers who rely on incentives to attract more
than their share of opportunistic employees. Incentive schemes naturally attract the
relatively opportunistic, because relatively opportunistic individuals see potential for
141. See generally JOEL COOPER, COGNITIvE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY (2007).
142. Id. at 15.
143. See supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text (discussing studies that find individual differences).
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personal gain that individuals who are more constrained by personal ethics would
discount as out-of-bounds and unavailable. Thus, it is perhaps no coincidence that Wall
Street executives are widely perceived to lack both empathy and ethics.'" Investment
banks and other financial firms are notorious for offering their employees incentive
compensation packages that create opportunities to reap millions of dollars.145
Moreover, once a workplace begins to attract more than its share of relatively
opportunistic or unethical employees, through a variety of different but mutually
reinforcing effects, it will also begin to repel the relatively prosocial and to subvert the
prosocial employees who remain at the firm into committing their own ethical lapses
(which, given cognitive dissonance, diminishes their prosociality). This phenomenon has
been described by William Black, an expert on white-collar crime, as a "Gresham's
dynamic in which bad ethics drives good ethics out of the marketplace."'46 Black, who
served as deputy staff director for the federal commission that investigated widespread
fraud in the savings and loan industry in the late 1980s, concludes that incentive-based
pay schemes created a Gresham's dynamic in the recent subprime mortgage crisis. The
practice of compensating loan brokers with incentive pay based largely on the number of
loans they originated led to a rapid deterioration in broker ethics and a subsequent
loosening of mortgage lending standards, with disastrous results."'
There are several reasons why workplaces that attract more than their share of
opportunists drive out prosocial behavior. First, relatively ethical employees conclude
they suffer a competitive disadvantage, and decamp for greener pastures where their
prosocial proclivities are less of a handicap. Alternatively, the relatively ethical may
conclude they can no longer afford to be so squeamish, and decide to dispense with their
ethics. Second, as the population of a workplace becomes dominated by opportunists,
with fewer and fewer conscientious employees, the risk that an opportunist's misconduct
will be revealed by a whistleblower declines. Third, as discussed in Part III, when a
workplace becomes crowded with opportunists, this changes social context. When
"everybody does it" (whether "it" is approving low-quality mortgage loans, committing
accounting fraud, or cheating on income taxes), it is easy to conclude that you can do it,
too.
Adverse selection pressures accordingly lead workplaces that rely on pay for
performance to attract a disproportionate share of relatively unethical and opportunistic
employees. For example, between 2000 and 2007, more than 10,000 individuals with
criminal records became mortgage brokers in Florida, leaving one to wonder how many
individuals attracted to that business were criminals who simply hadn't been caught yet.'
Once this occurs, the result can be a self-reinforcing dynamic in which prosocial
individuals and prosocial behaviors are driven out. It may even be possible to reach a
144. Consider Rolling Stone's description of investment bank Goldman Sachs as "a great vampire squid
wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like
money." Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE, July 9, 2009,
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-20100405.
145. Margaret Heffernan provides an interesting case study in how incentive pay led to criminal behavior
at Lehman brothers. HEFFERNAN, supra note 134, at 128-31.
146. Executive Compensation Hearing, supra note 5, at 201.
147. Id. at 201.
148. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 7, at 11.
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tipping point in which opportunistic behavior becomes so prevalent that prosocial
behavior within the company virtually disappears. Think of Enron, Countryside
Financial, or (in Rolling Stone's opinion) Goldman Sachs. The firm becomes, in effect, a
criminal enterprise populated primarily by employees who act like psychopaths-at least
until they get on the elevator and go home.
V. CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVES TO PAY FOR PERFORMANCE
As we have seen, optimal contracting theory embraces the quest for the complete
employment contract that perfectly aligns the interests of agent and principal so that all
"agency costs" disappear. This quest is a bit like the quest for the Holy Grail. No perfect
contract is possible, and gaps inevitably remain. What fills the gaps? According to
standard optimal contracting theory, only reputational concerns can, and any contractual
gap that cannot be filled by reputation will be exploited opportunistically and become a
source of agency costs. But (again according to the theory) this should not discourage us
from the quest to design ex ante incentive contracts that are as complete as possible, for
without such contracts, opportunism is inevitable and uncontrollable.
Behavioral science offers a different perspective. The human capacity to act
prosocially can also fill gaps in incomplete relational contracts, and motivate contract
partners to perform even when there is no realistic threat, or insufficient threat, of legal or
reputational sanction if they don't. This possibility deserves our attention, for behavioral
science also teaches that a workplace that emphasizes ex ante financial incentives will
tend to suppress the force of conscience in at least three ways: by shifting social context,
by creating temptations, and by introducing selection biases that favor less conscientious
individuals.
But if we don't use incentive contracts to motivate employee performance, what can
we use to motivate them? One can only get so much commitment, loyalty, and hard work
for free. In a capitalist society-perhaps in any society-few people are willing to work
long and hard for nothing. (When you take from each according to his ability and give to
each according to his needs, you are likely to end up with lots of needy, incompetent
people.) Eventually the siren call of self-interest invites even the most dedicated agent to
ask, "What's in it for me?""'
Something must be. Many Americans volunteer their time for various worthy
causes. But when it comes to full-time employment, most insist on being paid. It is
important to emphasize that critiquing incentive pay is not the same thing as critiquing
the general idea of paying. There are lots of ways to compensate and reward executives
and other agents for their efforts, beyond using large, material, ex ante incentives.
Thus, this Article concludes by addressing the question: if we don't use high-
powered ex ante financial incentives to motivate people, what can we use? Behavioral
science suggests an intriguing and counterintuitive answer. When employment contracts
are highly incomplete, instead of relying on material, large, ex ante contractual
incentives, employers might do well to adopt the opposite approach: emphasize rewards
149. Put differently, prosocial behavior tends to disappear when the personal cost of behaving prosocially
gets too high. See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text (discussing effects of personal cost on
prosociality).
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that are nonmaterial, relatively modest, and determined ex post on the basis of subjective
evaluations.
Let us first consider the advantages of using nonfinancial rewards. Behavioral
science supports human resource experts' belief that employing nonmaterial rewards-
greater job responsibilities, a better parking space, an "Employee of the Month" plaque-
can work as well or better than emphasizing material rewards like cash bonuses or stock
options."so Most obviously, job titles and award plaques cost firms much less to provide.
But there are psychological as well as economic advantages. Unlike monetary rewards,
which have intrinsic value unrelated to social context, nonmonetary rewards appeal to
employees' desires for status, esteem, and feelings of in-group membership. Such social
motivations naturally focus employee attention on social context rather than personal
financial circumstances-exactly where we want to focus employee attention to
encourage prosocial behavior."' Nonmonetary rewards also seem to do a better job of
preserving intrinsic employee motivations, such as interest, creativity, and desire for
mastery. In his bestseller, Drive, Daniel Pink emphasizes this advantage, surveying the
extensive experimental evidence that demonstrates how the prospect of monetary rewards
often reduces individuals' performance on tasks requiring creativity and persistence. "
Of course, man or woman cannot live on "Employee of the Month" awards alone.
Even the most prosocial employee has to pay the rent and buy groceries. Thus, most
employers must pay their employees reasonably competitive financial compensation. But
there are advantages, apart from the obvious cost savings, in trying to keep financial
compensation relatively modest. As we have seen, firms that avoid offering very large
financial incentives may benefit from employee selection bias because they are less likely
to attract selfish opportunists.' Of course, some businesses-used car dealerships, hedge
funds-may want to attract selfish opportunists, because employees perform tasks that
are relatively simple, the desired outcome is certain, and employee performance is easy to
observe, making it feasible to design relatively complete employment contracts with few
gaps for employees to exploit. But many businesses-schools, hospitals, public
corporations-must necessarily rely on employment contracts that are far more
incomplete and leave greater room for opportunistic behavior. For example, James
Sinegal, the CEO of Costco, works under an employment contract, whose terms
150. Susanne Neckermann et al., What Is an Award Worth? An Econometric Assessment of the Impact of
Awards on Employee Performance (Ctr. for Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 2657, 2009), available at
http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBaseContent/WP/WP-CESifoWorkingPapers/wp-cesifo-
2009/wp-cesifo-2009-05/cesifol wp2657.pdf.
151. A meta-analysis of 12 major research studies on employee engagement found that such social factors
as the degree to which the employer is perceived to care about employees, pride in the company, attachment to
coworkers, and personal relationships with managers were all important drivers of employee performance.
CONFERENCE BD., EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF CURRENT RESEARCH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 6
(2006), available at http://montrealoffice.wikispaces.com/file/view/Employee+Engagement+-+Conference
+Board .pdf.
152. See generally DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US (2009)
(discussing evidence on best ways to promote creativity and persistence).
153. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, WHAT PRICE THE MORAL HIGH GROUND? How To SUCCEED
WITHOUT SELLING YOUR SOUL (1990) (discussing how businesses can thrive by appealing to ethics and
conscience rather than selfishness and greed).
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supposedly "fit on a cocktail napkin." 5 4 In such cases, firms that can attract conscientious
employees-teachers who want students to learn, doctors who want to help patients,
CEOs who want to leave a legacy rather than simply take as much money as possible-
have an advantage. In addition to limiting adverse selection bias, avoiding incentive
contracts that provide for very large rewards also reduces the risk that otherwise prosocial
employees might be tempted to ignore their consciences, and avoids creating a social
context that suggests the employer believes employees work hard only for self-serving
reasons.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, behavioral science cautions against the
common yet often unspoken belief that compensation must be tied to predetermined,
objective metrics in order to be effective. One of the most dangerous consequences of
incentive ideology is that it blinds us to the possibility of using subjectively determined
ex post rewards rather than ex ante objective incentives to motivate performance in
relational contracts.'" The notions that employees might work conscientiously even
without predetermined incentives, or that employers might voluntarily reward
extracontractual efforts, conflict directly with optimal contracting theory's basic
assumption that both principals and agents are opportunistic and purely self-interested
actors. According to optimal contracting theory, no rational agent would ever work hard
simply because a principal said, "Do a good job, and I'll reward you appropriately." Nor
would any rational principal ever voluntarily reward an agent foolish enough to put in
extra effort. These sorts of prosocial behaviors require trust and trustworthiness, which
play no part in optimal contracting theory.
Yet trust and trustworthiness do play an important part in explaining real human
behavior."' This can be seen quite clearly in an interesting experimental variation on the
social dilemma game called, appropriately enough, the "trust game." A trust game is
simply a social dilemma in which two players act sequentially rather than simultaneously.
One of the two subjects (the "trustor") is first given a sum of money, say $100. Both
subjects are told the trustor can choose to contribute some or all of the $100 to an
investment fund, which the researchers will triple and then give to the second subject (the
"trustee"). The trustee then gets to choose whether she wants to keep the tripled funds
entirely for herself, or return all or some portion back to the trustor.
In a well-designed trust game where subjects play only once and anonymously, no
rational and selfish trustee would ever donate any of the tripled funds back to the trustor.
Anticipating this, no rational and selfish trustor would ever donate any of his initial stake
to the investment fund. In real trust games, however, the trustor typically shares more
than half his funds, and the trustee typically repays the trustor with a slightly larger
amount. '5
Employment relationships that rely on ex post rewards rather than ex ante incentives
154. Gretchen Morgenson, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Two Pay Packages, Two Different Galaxies,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/businesss/executive-pay-a-special-report-two-pay-
packages-two-different-galaxies.html.
155. Cf HEFFERNAN, supra note 134, at 56 ("Economic models work in ways very similar to ...
ideologies: pulling in and integrating the information that fits the model, leaving out what can't be
accommodated.").
156. See generally Blair & Stout, supra note 126 (discussing role of trust and trustworthiness in business).
157. STOuT, supra note 26, at 9; GAtcher, supra note 63, at 8.
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are directly analogous to the trust game. The employer first trusts the employee by
committing to pay him a salary that is not contingent on meeting objective metrics. Next,
the employee trusts the employer by working harder and more honestly than the
employer could force him to work under the terms of the formal contract. Then, the
employer reciprocates the employees' trust by giving the employee a raise and more job
responsibilities. This process of reciprocal trust and trustworthiness continues until either
the employee retires, or one of the parties fails to reciprocate, and the employment
relationship is severed because the employee either quits or is fired."' Experimental tests
of compensation arrangements that rely on employee trust and employer trustworthiness
this way show that they can be more effective than ex ante incentive contracts at inducing
employee effort in repeated interactions."'
At this point, any seasoned businessperson over the age of 50 should be
experiencing ddji vu. Optimal contracting theory recommends that employers seek to
negotiate employment contracts that are as complete as possible and that emphasize large
material rewards that are tied to objective performance metrics determined ex ante.
Behavioral science, however, counsels that when contracts are seriously incomplete, we
might do better to adopt the opposite approach: offer relatively modest pay, emphasize
nonmaterial rewards, and adjust financial compensation ex post on the basis of the
employer's subjective satisfaction with the employee's performance. This second
approach is exactly what the business world mostly relied on before Congress passed tax
legislation requiring corporations to tie executive pay to performance.
As discussed in Part II, before the 1993 adoption of I.R.C. Section 162(m), stock
options and other forms of incentive pay tied to objective metrics played a far less
important role in executive compensation practices than they do today.160 CEOs and other
executives typically received relatively modest salaries along with a variety of noncash
perquisites such as nicer offices, better parking spaces, and promotions to larger
divisions. Cash bonuses were common but relatively modest and set after-the-fact, on the
basis of the employee's performance as viewed subjectively by the company's board of
directors or senior managers. In other words, the business world followed exactly the sort
of compensation practices behavioral science recommends when contracts are seriously
incomplete. Judging from pre-1993 corporate performance and investor returns, the
system worked reasonably well.''
158. Cf Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction ofFormal and Informal Contracting in Theory,
Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1377 (2010) (describing a similar reciprocal trust dynamic in
commercial contracting).
159. See generally Martin Brown et al., Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions, 72
ECONOMETRICA 747, 749 (2004) (investigating compensation and employee efforts); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M.
Schmidt, Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model, 106 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 453
(2004) (same); Ernst Fehr et al., Fairness and Contract Design, 75 EcONOMETRICA 121 (2007) (same). A real-
life example can be found in the Mayo Clinic, perhaps the most highly regarded health care practice in the
nation, which insists on keeping all staff on fixed salaries in order to maintain its culture of collaboration and
patient focus. Leonard L. Barry & Kent D. Seltman, Building a Strong Services Brand: Lesson from Mayo
Clinic, 50 Bus. HORIZONS 199, 202 (2007).
160. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text. A 1988 paper by George Baker, Michael Jensen, and
Kevin Murphy critiqued prevailing compensation practices as "largely independent of performance." George P.
Baker et al., Compensation and Incentives: Practice v. Theory, 43 J. FIN. 593, 593 (1988).
161. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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History accordingly suggests that when they are left to their own devices,
businesspeople tend to be pretty good intuitive behavioral scientists. Indeed, they seem
superior in this regard to the academics and regulators who continue to argue that we
must tie pay to ex ante performance metrics. (These academics and regulators seem not to
have noticed the rather obvious fact that their own relatively modest pay isn't tied to
much of anything.) As evidence, some companies have already found an end run around
Section 162(m) that allows them to use ex post subjective rewards in a fashion quite
reminiscent of standard executive compensation practices before the rise of pay-for-
performance ideology. This can be seen in the increasing use of "plan within a plan" pay
schemes that give executives ex ante objective performance targets, but also allow
directors to retain subjective ex post discretion to reduce the maximum compensation
paid to the executive, even if the objective goal is met.16 2
What do such developing business practices imply about the ideology of incentives?
Most important, that it is just that: merely ideology, and counterproductive ideology to
boot. America's great achievements in the twentieth century-sending humans to the
moon, winning World War II, beating polio, building great global public corporations
like IBM, Ford, Xerox, and General Electric-were all accomplished without the aid of
"optimal contracting." Yet, despite the absence of reliable empirical evidence to support
it, a belief that incentive contracts are essential to good performance not only captured
our corporate boardrooms, but it is now spreading to our schools, hospitals, and
newsrooms as well. Behavioral science and history both caution against this
development.
162. See SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, DELAWARE FEDERAL COURT ISSUES SIGNIFICANT RULING
CONCERNING IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PROVISIONS OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE ON
DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW GOVERNING SHAREHOLDER VOTING (2013), available at
http://www.Shearman.com/-/media/Files/Newsnsights/Publications/2013/07/Delaware-Federal-Court-Issues-
Significant-Ruling_/Files/View-full-memo- Delaware-Federal-Court-Issues-Sig/FileAttachment/Delaware
FederalCourtIssuesRulinonlmpactofExecut_.pdf (discussing "plan within a plan" under Section 162(m) in
relation to Judge Sue L. Robinson's ruling in Freeman v. Redstone, Civ. No. 12-1052-SLR, 2013 WL 3753426
(D. Del. July 16, 2013)).
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